Scholars and practitioners within the public management, policy, and nonprofit communities have called for a better understanding of the context and variation with which government manages its contracting relationships with nonprofit organizations. In this study, that relationship is examined using agency theory and stewardship theory. Interviews were conducted with public and nonprofit managers involved in social services contract relationships at the state and county level in New York State. The findings suggest that nonprofits engaged in contracts with government are managed both as agents and stewards depending on a number of factors. The level of competition, type of service provided, and degree of public management capacity each influence the manner in which the contract relationship is managed, the type of incentives and sanctions used, the degree of oversight applied, and the frequency and precision with which information is exchanged. Additionally, the manner in which nonprofit service providers are managed influences whether market competition is developed and harnessed, the extent to which goal congruence is achieved, accountability preserved, and clients are well served. Nonprofits not only serve as implementers of policy and deliverers of services, but depending on how they are managed they may also participate in the policy formulation and policy evaluation stages of the policy process. In many ways, nonprofit contractors are the new de facto street-level bureaucrats and pose complex challenges for the public managers responsible for managing these contract relationships.
Introduction
Scholars and practitioners within the public management, policy, and nonprofit communities have called for theories that better explain the nature of and variation in the government-nonprofit contracting relationship and the implications of contracting for public management (DeHoog 1984 , Donahue 1989 , Salamon 1989 , Saidel 1991 , Kettl 1993 , Smith and Lipsky 1993 , Lynn 1996 , Gooden 1998 , Johnston and Romzek 1999 , Romzek and Johnston 2002 , Van Slyke 2003 . This call stems largely from the effects of devolution and privatization on government service provision. Increasingly, states and counties are fundamentally reshaping the mission of government and the services they have historically funded and delivered. Philosophically, policy makers are enacting decisions that not only restrict but in many cases remove government from direct service delivery to citizens. With direct government service provision in many service areas a fleeting memory, and privatization arrangements no longer viewed simply as neoconservative attempts to reduce the size of government, nonprofit, faith-based, and for-profit contractors have become the new street level bureaucrats.
Privatization, as both a tool and process, involves "changing from an arrangement with high government involvement to one with less" (Savas 1987, 88) . Privatization advocates argue that government will receive better services at lower costs because of the expertise of private providers. This argument rests on "introduc [ing] competition and market forces in[to] the delivery of public services" (Savas 2000, 122) . There are at least ten different forms of privatization including asset sales, vouchers, grants, leases, franchising, and deregulation.
However, the most frequently used form of privatization is contracting with a third-party for production of goods and provision of services. For government to leverage the advantages associated with privatization, public managers need to act as smart buyers, which requires public management capacity in the form of managers having expertise in contract management, substantive policy expertise, the ability to negotiate, monitor, and communicate expectations and technical information. Each skill is necessary for managing programs and providers in politicized environments in which political and funding support is necessary for program continuation, and where ensuring democratic accountability is a paramount concern.
Contracting for goods and services deemed not to be inherently governmental in nature, such as office cleaning, road repair, and waste removal are often characterized as existing in competitive markets and providing goods that are both measurable and observable. In such cases, developing contracts that ensure goal alignment and accountability is manageable and economically and politically desirable. In other service areas, such as social services, the distinction between what are inherently governmental and what can realistically be contracted out is less clear. Social services are a policy area in which 72 percent of the programs are contracted out.
1 Social services markets vary in their level of competition, and the services provided may not always be easily observed and measured. Despite these challenges, these contract relationships are developed and the contractors managed, not simply because they may be economically feasible, but also because they are often politically popular. So how do public managers manage contracts with third-party providers, such as nonprofits, for programs like social services in which the inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes are not always easily observed and measured?
The various professional disciplines have for more than two decades asserted that research on this relationship has to move beyond the single organizational case study, be linked to social science theory, and consist of multi-method, multi-site examinations (Kettl and Milward 1996, Lynn 1996) . In essence, to advance public management research and knowledge about the manner and variation in which public managers manage their contractors, theory must be tested and empirical data collected if in fact the government-nonprofit relationship is to be more fully understood in all its complexity, variation, and sophistication. This topic is of significant importance for public management scholars given government's continued devolution of responsibility to states and counties for program implementation, and the reliance by many public agencies on nonprofit organizations, under contract to government, to deliver services (Milward 1994, Johnston and Romzek 1999) .
In this study, the government-nonprofit social services contracting relationship is examined using agency theory and stewardship theory. Each theory focuses on using different tools in contract relationships in order to achieve goal alignment between the parties to the contract. Agency theory has been described as the central approach to a theory of managerial behavior (Ross 1987) , while stewardship theory has been framed as the organizational behavior counterweight to rational action theories of managerial behavior (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997) . Two questions are examined: First, what public management contract practices are applied to nonprofits in the contracting relationship? Second, what conditions affect the public management contract practices applied to nonprofit organizations in the contracting relationship? To begin, substantive reviews of the government-nonprofit contracting relationship, agency theory, and stewardship theory are examined. Next, the methods and data are presented followed by the findings and conclusions and public management implications.
Background

Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationships
Social services are often characterized by varying levels of tractable and intractable client problems, varying levels of client motivation, clients requiring specialized treatment expertise, client intervention involving long time periods, markets consisting of varying levels of competition, and the speed or lack thereof in which legislation mandating services is both funded and implemented. Monitoring and evaluating performance and outcomes is often time consuming and expensive because many of the services are not easily observed and measured. In a word, social services are complex. They are complex services for which government may have some expertise, but often requires additional expertise that it must either hire or contract for in order to treat and serve its clients. There are other challenges to be sure, including barriers to market entry, especially in terms of program and personnel cost and physical infrastructure, but also the fact that there may be supply-side imperfections that government agencies and public managers attempt to correct for.
Another challenge is that social services are prime candidates to be privatized in part because alternatives to government provision exist, namely through the use of nonprofits for service provision. 2 There is also generally strong support among policy makers to follow through on historical precedent to remove government from providing what other nongovernmental organizations are already or can potentially provide. Nonprofits are perceived to be ideal partners to government because of their organizational form and mission. Nonprofits, by virtue of their tax status as exempt organizations, are prohibited from distributing profits to shareholders, are governed by a board of volunteers, and frequently are thought to solve the contract failure problem because they have less incentive to exploit asymmetric information for their own gain.
It is because of their organizational missions and outreach that nonprofits are thought to share similar goals with government leading to contract relationships in which contractor opportunism and malfeasance are less rigorously controlled for. 3 The complexities of social service contracting are compounded by governments tendency to reduce its number of employees following privatization, which decreases governments capacity to manage the governmentnonprofit contracting relationship and all of its component parts (costs associated with developing competition, awarding contracts, monitoring and evaluating contractors, and holding contractors accountable for service quality and client satisfaction). Salamon (1989, 11) captured this challenge in observing that contracting relationships "create serious public management and accountability problems for which public administration theory fails to prepare us."
A number of scholars have contributed empirical research, normative evaluations, and substantial commentary to our knowledge base about this relationship. A brief review of the empirical literature is appropriate to understand the context and background of this relationship.
There are several findings across the empirical studies that are worth considering before evaluating the manner in which government-nonprofit contracting relationships are managed.
First, there is a lack of competition by geographic market (rural, suburban, urban) and service type (refugee resettlement, substance abuse and addiction) which makes it difficult for public managers to correct for supply-side imperfections (too few market providers) and constrains their use of contract termination as a management strategy because of the lack of provider alternatives (Beinecke and DeFillippi 1999 , DeHoog 1984 , Johnston and Romzek 1999 , Morgan and England 1992 , Romzek and Johnston 2002 , Smith and Smyth 1996 , Van Slyke 2003 .
Second, the lack of administrative capacity in government agencies limits their ability to develop competition, solicit bids and rebid contracts, develop performance measures, monitor contractors, and hold contractors accountable for contract goals, service quality, and client satisfaction because there are too few personnel with contract management and policy and program expertise (DeHoog 1984 , Smith and Lipsky 1993 , Moe 1996 , Smith and Smyth 1996 , Meyers etal. 1998 , Johnston and Romzek 1999 ,Sandfort 1999 , Romzek and Johnston 2002 , and Van Slyke 2003 .
Third, policy directives, policy goals, and corresponding performance requirements are often ambiguously defined and infrequently monitored, creating situations in which public managers are unsure of the frequency, consistency, and quality of service delivery among its contractors. This can lead to goal divergence between policy directives and implementation practices, presenting genuine accountability concerns for public managers (Johnston and Romzek 1999 , Meyers et.al. 1998 , Meyers et.al. 2001 , Riccucci 2002 , Sandfort 1999 .
Fourth, contracting relationships between government and nonprofit organizations can have the unintended effect of altering nonprofit governance practices, causing mission drift, deprofessionalization of staff, and contributing to a position of government funding dependency (Alexander et al. 1999 , Kramer and Grossman 1987 , Kramer 1994 , Saidel 1991 , Smith and Lipsky 1993 .
Agency Theory
Agency theory, also frequently referred to as the principal-agent model, is a theoretical framework that has been used to explain the behavior of both the principal and the agent and is the area of economic theory most concerned with accountability while correcting for opportunistic behavior that results from asymmetric information (Alchian and Demsetz 1972 , Jensen and Meckling 1996 , Frey 1993 , Donahue 1989 , Eisenhardt 1988 , Kettl 1993 , Smith and Lipsky 1993 , Kearns 1994 , Bogart 1995 , McDonald 1997 , Moe 1984 , Savas 1987 , Sappington 1991 . As is the case with managerialist theories rooted in economics, agency theory is concerned with designing optimal contracts and achieving efficiency yet assumes self-interest over the attainment of collective interests. This assumption guides many of the management and governance mechanisms used to ensure that there is goal convergence among the contracting parties. The principal delegates responsibility to the agent for the production or delivery of a good or service. The principal and agent agree on the terms of the contract including the inputs, processes, outcomes, and how the agent is to be compensated for doing the work of the principal.
For purposes of this research, government, specifically public managers, will be referred to as the principal and nonprofit organizations, specifically their executive directors, as agents. Selecting the right structure for contract relationships presents a basic problem for contracting officials. Two assumptions characterize the principal-agent model: 1) there is goal conflict between the wealth-maximizing behavior of the principal and utility-maximizing behavior of the agent; and 2) agents have more information than principals, which results in information asymmetry that agents can exploit for self-gain rather than for the collective interests of the contracting parties. The tenets of agency theory that attempt to explain and structure contracts include information asymmetry (when one party has information the other party does not possess), adverse selection (when one party knows more about attributes of a product or service than another and, as a result, the uninformed party runs the risk of purchasing a product or service of low quality), and moral hazard (when a party to the contract uses information and expertise and acts opportunistically, in its own self-interest, to the exclusion of the agreed upon contract goals). 5 To correct for the inefficiencies that can arise from contracts because of the aforementioned assumptions, incentives, sanctions, and monitoring are used to motivate and enforce the behavior of agents toward goal alignment. 6 According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992) , the principal delegates risk to the agent, and the more risk an agent is willing to assume, the greater the level of incentives needed to ensure goal convergence. Similarly, more resources need to be spent on monitoring when giving strong incentives is desirable. Careful performance measurement and powerful incentives should complement one another to ensure goal alignment.
The principal-agent model has been applied across the three sectors of the economy and has focused on a number of different contract scenarios. This range is illustrated by the following studies: 7 legislative compliance and bureaucratic politics (Moe 1984, McGubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987) ; monitoring and compensation issues (Sappington 1991, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000) ; the information economics of contract networks (Tirole 1986 ); elected officials as agents of their constituency (the principal) (Parker 1992) ; the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy (Wood and Waterman 1991) ; the budgetary effects of municipal service contracting (Stein 1990) ; the "crowding out effect" in personal relationships (Frey 1993) ;
the relationship between political interests and effective enforcement (Scholz 1991) ; accountability of nonprofit organizations (Bogart 1994 , Brody 1996 ; behaviors of collaboration and confrontation (Mukherji and Wright 1996) ; the impact of ownership structures on R&D investments (Lee and O'Neill 2003) ; the privatization-performance relationship (Dharwadkar, George, and Brandes 2000) ; franchising in government (Halachmi 1996) ; non-sanctioned managerial behaviors and bureaucratic resistance (Carr and Brower 2000) ; and strategic interaction and asymmetric information in the nonprofit sector (Ortmann 1996) . In addition, (Eisenhardt 1989 ) provides a useful tabular summary of studies other than the aforementioned whose origins are primarily in the private sector.
Critics of the principal-agent model, such as Perrow (1986) and Donaldson (1990) have argued that the model is one-sided because it neglects the potential exploitation of workers, assumes that altruism is always a function of an individual's continuous utility maximization strategy, ignores opportunistic behavior by principals, and exaggerates individual self-interest in organizations and negatively characterizes their moral and collective behavior as self-seeking behavior designed to obtain power. It is argued that the theory does not address the extent to which a strong organizational culture and employee commitment can actually enhance the productivity of "principled agent" workers who require few incentives and little monitoring (DiIulio, 1994) and, that it disregards personal ethics and morality as constructs not representative of the majority of individuals in contract relationships (Bohren 1998) .
Stewardship Theory
Stewardship theory examines relationships and behaviors often ignored in economic theories, emphasizing collective, pro-organizational behavior in which a higher value is placed on goal convergence than on agent self-interest. Stewardship theory "defines situations in which managers are not motivated by individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals" (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997, 21) .
Mechanisms that motivate individuals to behave as stewards include organizational structure, autonomy and responsibility, empowering governance structures, and trust. The theory has its roots in the sociological and psychological literatures, particularly building on the works of the early human relations theorists, who suggested needs such as affiliation, achievement, recognition, and responsibility are important tools of motivation. When these needs are satisfied in a principal-steward relationship, goal alignment can be realized.
In contrast to the "agent" of agency theory, a steward places greater value on collective rather than individual goals and views the successes of the organization or contract as accomplishment and incentive for achieving goal alignment, absent any immediate financial payoff or maximization of individual utility. Stewards make decisions they perceive to be in the best interests of clients. They are motivated by intrinsic rewards, which include level of responsibility, job satisfaction, work environment, affiliation, self-actualization, achievement, job stability and tenure, and adherence to organizational mission. Fundamentally, stewardship theory relies significantly on the principal's and stewards' initial disposition toward trust. As
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman's (1995) earlier research identifies, trust is the willingness and risk of being vulnerable, on the part of both actors, to the possibility that one actor in the contract may pursue their own self-interest to the exclusion of the collectively agreed upon goals of the contract.
Contract design and structure also influence a steward's opportunity to positively affect the organizations they serve. The principal must cultivate stewards and provide them with the necessary resources to serve the organization and fulfill the terms of the contract. One such resource is the organizational governance structure of the principal. 8 These structures are critical for developing and supporting a culture that encourages empowerment, autonomy, and principal/steward trust (Braithwaite 1998) . Some organizations speak of empowering workers and promoting entrepreneurial decision making, but it is organizations whose environment, culture, and governance structures reflect these ideals that ultimately reward the desired steward behavior. Steward behavior is more strongly associated with those organizational cultures and societies in which collective behaviors are embedded and accentuated in social norms (Hofstede, 1993) . The principal-steward relationship is less focused on controlling behavior and defining high task programmability situations that allow for extensive monitoring, but rather on output based relationships in which responsibility and trust are the foundations for long, mutually aligned contractual relationships.
Stewardship theory has only recently been used to examine contractual relationship in the public and nonprofit sectors. For some time, public management and privatization researchers have observed and suggested that not all social service contract relationships are well managed in terms of goal alignment, performance, and accountability when the only model of contract management used is that of agency theory. Van Slyke and Connelly (1997) used stewardship theory as an alternative theoretical model for understanding government-nonprofit contract relationships. They suggested that shared values may underlie the contract relationship and the way to enhance these is not by relying solely on the classic command and control, hierarchical, legal compliance-based model consistent with the principal-agent framework, but rather for government and nonprofits to develop relational contracts. Bundt (2000) and Dicke (2000) have used the concept of principal-steward relationships to examine accountability in contract relationships and the values that underlie goal alignment.
Stewardship theory and agency theory represent the idealized tails of the management continuum in which individual behavior is managed using specific tools to align the actions of agents and stewards with the goals of principals. They are also strong frameworks from which to evaluate the government-nonprofit contract relationship. The main themes, tenets, and applications of agency, stewardship, and privatization theory are summarized in table 1.
Insert Table 1 here
Methods and Data
Social services in New York State provide an ideal opportunity to investigate government-nonprofit contracting relationships from the agency theory and stewardship theory perspectives. New York State serves as the research site for this study because it has consistently used contracting as a vehicle for program implementation and is one of only 12 states in which counties have responsibility for administering federal programs (Riedinger et.al. 1999 
Agents or Stewards?
Public and nonprofit managers described a number of practices employed to manage contractual relationships with nonprofit organizations. Variation in how public management practices were applied and the conditions under which they were applied is examined. While some variation does exist, it was not nearly as expansive as varying conditions would seem to warrant. This is perplexing from a public management perspective because different conditions would seem to call for different management practices. What did materialize was a complex managerial environment, particularly in medium and small counties, that was devoid of competition, administrative capacity, and clearly defined and agreed upon outcomes. The contract management practices resulting from administrative capacity shortages, a dearth of providers, and measurement uncertainty were trust, the use of reputation and information exchange as incentives and sanctions, and monitoring. This research finds that public managers are not using rigidly defined management functions and skills, such as the functions of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling in their management of contracted nonprofit social service providers. Rather, they adopt management practices that reflect their limited capacity levels and the markets in which they operate.
Trust
The public management practice of trust is frequently identified as a leadership strategy intended to create an atmosphere in which behaviors directed toward goal alignment are enacted (Quinn et.al., 1996) . However, specific reference has not been made to the motivational skill of rewarding employees or providers through trust and enhanced reputation (Rue and Byars 2000, Schemerhorn 1999 ). The issue of trust is at the center of the contractual relationships between public agencies and nonprofit organizations and the manner in which they are managed. Trust has cost implications, is affected by the level of decentralization, and is integrally linked to reputation, information exchange, the types of rewards and sanctions applied to providers, and how providers are monitored. The attitudes, values, and trust dispositions of public managers about contractors, program areas, and clients affects how trust is developed, extended, used, and rewarded.
Trust is a major psychological and social process that underlies developing, maintaining, changing, and discontinuing contracts. Larson (1992) found that written agreements and contracts were less important in economic exchange than the social dimensions associated with mutual trust and reputation that formed the foundation for future transactions. Findings from this research support this claim. While the contract participants were aware of the legal implications and sanctions that could be imposed as a result of goal divergence, the reality is that contractual relationships are managed largely based on the quality of the relationships established between public managers and providers. This is a result of several factors. First, very few of the contracts were performance-based and fewer still contained observable and measurable outcomes upon which provider performance is evaluated. Rather much of the contractual focus on performance is tied to input, process, and output variables that measure the basic components of program intervention and service delivery. Second, administrative capacity constraints left public managers with few opportunities to develop competition in service markets with one provider.
This is different at the state level than the county level. At the state level, many of the service programs contracted out as a result of an RFP process were statewide appropriations based on need. Often this meant that some of the appropriated contract monies were awarded to providers in very competitive marketplaces and others, though less in sum, to providers in smaller and less competitive geographic areas. With the exception of the urban county, the suburban and rural counties often consisted of a single nonprofit provider with the capacity and expertise to contract with government for service provision.
At both levels, public managers supported the proposition that trust is at the center of contractual relationships, and is the single most important dimension in how and under what conditions providers are to be managed.
"Trust is outcome based, based on success. You could have a history, but that history is built on success. We're not a very trusting agency."
These statements reflect the viewpoints offered by many of the public managers interviewed.
Trust is achieved based on repeated interactions and transactions in which goals are achieved; consistent responses are given to questions, and information is made available in a timely fashion upon request. In dyadic relationships, trust is built over time, through information exchange, by success, and because mutual benefits could be derived through future transactions. Many of the nonprofit executive directors described trust as an "attitude." An attitude of "what can I do to make this better versus a woe is me, this isn't right attitude." As one executive director stated "they [the public manager and bureau director] trust us to be politically sophisticated and not to say anything that is going to embarrass the governor's administration." Public managers spoke of being able to go to an executive director and individual board members they personally trusted and getting their objectives achieved. 17 They approached nonprofit leaders in a nonconfrontational manner and resolved situations that had the potential for conflict before it occurred. Public managers expressed confidence, based on their self-reported intuition that executive directors would self-regulate and monitor themselves because they were risk averse to the diminution of trusting relationships and therefore contracts.
In many of the cases, the term "relationship" was an appropriate and accurate term to characterize the state of contractual relations between the public agency and nonprofit provider. Public managers and executive directors recounted numerous instances of sharing information that served to benefit each other. In some cases nonprofit organizations would share true cost data with public managers in an effort to assist them in their own strategic resource planning and budget preparations. With the exception of issues about confidentiality, which each individual adhered to, many public managers would assist executive directors whom they implicitly trusted with information about how to navigate the bureaucracy, who they should talk
to, and what political strategies to enact so as to secure support from agency executives and other officials. This was an interesting finding because providing assistance and sharing information based on mutual trust appeared to positively impact the effectiveness of the relationship in terms of the quality of programs and the well being of the clients. Trust in the relationship was used to publicly demonstrate the effectiveness of public-private partnerships. Trust serves to minimize the management costs normally incurred as a result of controlling for opportunism resulting from asymmetric information.
Trusting relationships were managed in other ways as well. In relationships in which public managers could point to and quantify experiences of success with a provider, they were more willing to provide letters of support for additional funding to their agency superiors, appropriation committees, elected officials, and other agencies that may contract for similar types of expertise. If a nonprofit organization had a history of success the public agencies and managers would work with the provider to secure additional resources and use capacity building funds, where available, to assist in developing and refining their administrative processes and programmatic initiatives. Relationships that reached this stage, frequently taking many years and built on histories of success, were characterized by low levels of monitoring, enhancing a providers reputation, and involving nonprofit providers as partners in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of policy. As public managers noted, "when you trust that they're doing what they say they're doing you don't have to watch them as closely." Over a period of time public managers describe a transformation of the contract relationship from a principal-agent to a principal-steward relationship. When providers achieved this level they were referred to as preferred providers, those easy to work with and manage, reputable, and qualified.
Once providers perceived and affirmed that they were trusted they were able to be more creative, innovative, and could make bolder more assertive policy and programmatic decisions. As one provider said "we could not have taken risks which led to trust and rewards without experience which led to our reputation."
Reputation
Reputation is an organizational, programmatic, and individual attribute used by public managers for assessing the nonprofit landscape. It is a mechanism used by public managers for evaluating the past performance of nonprofit organizations, and for identifying future providers.
It is also used as a tool by public managers to reward providers, in terms of enhancing a provider's reputation, and as a sanction to providers, in the form of openly and publicly questioning a providers credibility and service quality, or at a minimum being silent on the provider's reputation to others. Reputation serves as a commodity for many nonprofit organizations because of its causal relationship with trust and ultimately with continued funding.
"In a small county your reputation is all that you have." "Competition is not as important as reputation."
These insights from public managers reflect the importance that reputation plays in the contracting process. Reputation is established in a number of ways. It is most often built through past performance, meeting goals and achieving outcomes, and attaining goal convergence. It is a factor that can, over time, transform contractual relationships from a hierarchically ordered principal-agent relationship to a more horizontally integrated principal-steward arrangement based on shared goals and trust. As public managers expressed:
"Those providers, that do what they say they are going to do, deliver what they say they will deliver, and meet time lines, goals, and produce measurable outcomes are the organizations whose reputations will be enhanced."
Failure to deliver on these criteria can also lead to the diminution of reputation. Reputation is frequently referred to in the economics literature as a "contract enforcer" because of its historical role in promoting and ensuring goal alignment (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) .
While reputation may play a smaller role in spot market transactions, its role is accentuated in authority relations where there are repeated transactions.
Public managers rely on reputation and often use existing providers they are happy with to deliver services even in programmatic areas in which the provider may not have direct expertise and experience. This is a more common practice than the contracting literature has generally acknowledged. DeHoog's (1985) findings suggested that this was employed less as a management practice for ensuring goal alignment and more as a means for bureaucrats to minimize their work responsibilities. Nonprofit executive directors described reputation as, "you're buying a history and stability, reliability, community presence, and quality assurance."
Public managers confirmed that in many cases this characterization of reputation is true and insisted it is not because they are indolent, but rather is a proactive strategy to minimize instances in which contract providers may act in their own interest to the exclusion of the contract goals. A commissioner captured this sentiment by revealing that:
"the risk of rebuke [resulting from public recognition of contractor malfeasance] is too high, where we have a known quantity that we can work with, that's who we're going to go with; it cuts risk for us."
This statement affirms a number of the conflicted values public managers expressed in their angst about exposure to fraud, and their concomitant decision not to seek additional providers, even when they were available, because of their aversion to risk, dependence on a particular provider's reputation, and their own lack of confidence in the capacity of other providers. Public managers cited another reason for relying on reputation; it provides the public agency with a degree of legitimacy from which to market or blame depending on how the relationship develops. If a reputable provider is exposed as acting in an opportunistic manner, then the public agency has some leverage in being able to say publicly that this was a reputable organization and there was no way of knowing they would act this way. Public managers exhibited risk averse behavior because their fear of public rebuke is so high, and administrative capacity so constrained, that even when they wanted to exercise more progressive management techniques and develop competition, they often did not do so.
A deputy commissioner expressed a perspective confirmed by other public managers in commenting "enhancing a nonprofit organization's reputation is more than anything I can give them." This is a significant finding in that public managers saw themselves as able to reward and enhance a nonprofit organizations reputation through repeated contracting opportunities, recommending the provider to other state agencies, and using them to deliver services where they might not have previous experience. Another form for rewarding trusted providers was to hold them up as countywide and statewide examples of effective partnerships. Trusted and reputable providers also were invited to attend and participate in public events with the public managers and their agencies. Nonprofit executive directors were invited to serve on and speak at professional boards, committees, conference panels, and public hearings. They were also invited to participate in the formulation of policy. By participating in these types of events, providers gained legitimacy, credibility, visibility, and enhanced reputation. The outcome of this type of reward and its publicness allowed nonprofit providers an opportunity to achieve additional funding opportunities, requests to consult and share their programmatic expertise with other providers and public agencies, and the opportunity to serve in high visibility public roles, such as being an executive member of a statewide professional association. The visibility and legitimacy provide the nonprofit with a vehicle they could use to give voice to their clientele's issues in a public forum in which respect and credibility were accorded to the providers by public managers, elected officials, and the media. Nonprofit leaders recognized the value of these non-financial rewards. As an executive director noted "these opportunities give me access to the types of people I would not normally have the opportunity to interact with. I can educate and advocate with credibility without being perceived as a threat...this is where I can get involved in the legislative process...and that's how we're going to benefit as an organization. That's my job as the ED and these are the relationships I need to establish."
This executive director's comments capture many of the nonprofits leaders' sentiments about the importance and benefits of being perceived as reputable and legitimate. There were, however, those providers that did not feel that these "reputational rewards" were rewards at all. As one executive director commented "profiling us hasn't brought us any additional funding and that's what this organization needs." For several of the smaller nonprofit organizations, especially when competing for state-wide contracts, intangible, non-financial, psychological rewards do not pay the bills, provide for staff increases, or assist in offering additional services.
At the same time saying nothing about an organization, such as a provider with a noted community name and reputation, was a subtle sanction. Repeated incidences of not commenting on a provider were thought by public managers to erode the high level of support and therefore over time reduce the public pressures to contract with these specific organizations. Public and nonprofit managers spoke about those nonprofit organizations that had achieved notable public reputations often exceeding their service quality due to their organizational marketing strategies and lack of high profile setbacks. Because this class of provider enjoyed a favorable public reputation, elected officials often exerted pressure on public managers to contract with them.
The frequently cited end result was one of mediocre performance. They were neither great nor poor performers, but marginal in what they did.
Public managers were quick to acknowledge that the rewards they can legitimately and publicly offer are not going to be valued and appreciated by all providers in the same way. Yet as one public manager observed, by at least giving them the non-financial and psychological rewards they might attract additional funding in the long-term. Therefore, they were keenly aware that their limited cache of incentives and rewards might be insufficient in curbing opportunistic behavior among some providers. And, they expressed concern that nonprofits under contract represent the agency in a public arena.
Monitoring
A number of different monitoring strategies were used to oversee the actions of providers and the quality of the services delivered. These include, but are not limited to, co-locating public staff at a nonprofit organizations office, conducting performance audits by program staff and financial audits by the Comptroller's office, contacting providers on consistent basis, performing site visits on capital projects such as those funded under the Homeless Housing Assistance
Program, requiring quarterly report such as the Consolidated Fiscal Report (CFR), demanding corrective action plans (CAP) from providers on probation, mandating client surveys as a component of demonstrating contractor performance and service quality, reviewing a provider's diagnosis of a client, and relying on feedback from caseworkers in the field and other providers.
Monitoring and compliance issues are established and included in much of the boilerplate contract language that exists in all of the contractual agreements between public agencies and nonprofit providers. The important findings to emerge from this research have less to do with the mechanisms used to monitor providers, (though co-location is certainly one of the more interesting and innovative uses of personnel), and more to do with variation in the level of intensity in which providers are monitored. Intuitively, we would expect, given the theoretical tenets guiding our understanding of contracting, that conditions of low trust would result in greater levels of monitoring and higher trust would result in less intense levels of monitoring.
The findings suggest that there is actually much less variation in the level of monitoring used to oversee provider actions and that given the competing demands on public staffs to contract for more services with less capacity, monitoring as a management tool was used more as a measure of last resort than as an active management and governance tool used to reduce fraud and abuse and achieve accountability through goal alignment.
The public managers interviewed at the Office of Mental Health (OMH) suggested varying levels of monitoring based on program area. In certain programs, there was a culture of regulatory compliance and resources were allocated to the oversight function. This was consistent with the legislative mandates that set up the Commission on Quality of Care (COQC) which served to oversee and monitor OMH's ability to oversee its providers and services. This is a case of multiple levels of oversight existing to insure that opportunism does not exist and that a standard of service quality is being produced. Yet, providers who contracted with this public agency perceived the monitoring actions of COQC and OMH as duplicative, costly, and untrusting of their actions and services. This level of monitoring was characterized by low trust, fear of culpability, and the threat of exposure by the public and media to instances of abuse.
There was little variation by provider in the intensity with which they were monitored. A provider contracting over a long period of time, possessing a strong reputation, and achieving performance goals was not monitored more or less than a provider contracting with a government agency for the first time.
Low levels of monitoring were the norm in agencies without a culture of regulatory compliance. One public manager's explanation resonated consistently with the views expressed by 80 percent of the public managers interviewed when commenting that ...we wouldn't like to admit it, or say that we're not monitoring. Part of it stems from staffing and capacity issues. Part of it is that we build in monitoring, but the burden is on the provider. So we're asking for reporting mechanisms. We have over 500 providers and 12 people to follow up. How much do you do that?...Of all the functions we need to do, getting budget proposals, making contract decisions, getting this service completed, signing off, which one will people not notice if we don't do? Monitoring. ... Contractors will notice if they're not getting paid, clients will notice if they have nowhere to go, few will notice an absence of monitoring. Our management certainly notices if we have the appropriation of funds and yet we don't get the RFP out or we say we have an RFP, but we're not ready to make that decision yet. Question is why haven't we spent the money yet? But the monitoring is the one that everyone agrees is critical and important and is not happy if it doesn't happen, but is also the one they're not asking about every day.
This comment reflects many of the frustrations public managers feel about monitoring and is integral to the decisions the managers make about how, where, and when to allocate their scarce human and financial resources to oversight. Agency theory is prescriptive in suggesting that monitoring is necessary for principals to ensure goal alignment with agents. In a principalsteward relationship it would be acceptable for a principal to monitor a steward less especially if the principal had contracted with the steward over a long period of time, the steward has a strong reputation, and has a history of goal alignment. The quote above however reveals that management theory aside, administrative capacity constraints have contributed to a contracting environment in which public managers do not actively use monitoring as a contract management tool.
Internal documents obtained at the time of the interviews included a number of
Comptroller audits that frequently commented on "the absence or severe lack of monitoring,"
project documentation, over reliance on providers to document community need, lack of capacity and information systems necessary for oversight, and few, if any, systematic attempts at data collection. Comptroller audits that identified similar weaknesses in state and county oversight actions were equally harsh. The indictments leveled against a number of statewide agencies for a variety of program and service areas regarding their lack of formal and consistent oversight were ubiquitous. Other types of reports were also critical of the oversight exercised by state and local agencies. One example is a report published jointly by the Assembly Children and Families
Committee and The Oversight, Analysis, and Investigation Committee titled "Losing Our
Children." In this report, a critical finding is that "the state agency culture leaves operations to the districts, without ensuring that laws are being implemented and clients are being well served."
Nonprofit providers were cognizant of the capacity limitations faced by public agencies and in many cases sought out and solicited their public contract managers to monitor them more frequently. The executive directors expressed a desire for greater levels of monitoring as a mechanism to drive out poor performing competitors and draw attention and funding resources to the work they are doing. Nonprofits sought monitoring from public managers with the expectation that it would lead to rewards in the forms already discussed. In addition, they wanted the opportunity to educate their public sector counterparts on the work they were doing, the clientele being served, and some of the obstacles they were facing in serving their constituency.
Sixty-five percent of the executive directors interviewed indicated they had invited their public contract managers and bureau directors to come to their site, see what they were doing, and meet the staff and clients. Yet, with only a few exceptions were the providers successful in attracting monitoring, attention, and opportunity to interact and educate. The nonprofit executive directors were critical of the capacity constraints in public agencies.
One criticism is that the burden of monitoring is placed on nonprofit organizations in the form of increased reporting requirements. Increasing the frequency and volume of information requested in the form of reports required nonprofits to allocate more of their administrative resources to meeting this contract requirement. What frustrated the executive directors most is that different reports from multiple bureaus within the same agency were required by the contracts. Nonprofit leaders asserted there is very little communication and coordination among bureaus in an agency and little consideration for the impact contract reporting has on diminishing nonprofits' administrative capacity. A second related criticism is that reporting mechanisms are used as proxies for oversight. This action frustrated the nonprofit leaders because it did not accurately portray the type of intervention, the need for continuity of care, and true level of funding needed for effective treatment. When new performance reporting systems were developed, nonprofit executive directors reacted harshly because the data being gathered looked only at inputs, activities, and outputs, thereby failing to examine clinical diagnosis, the severity of client needs, and service integration for more medically complex clients.
In the end, large-scale variation in the type of management practices employed to ensure goal alignment, particularly in the case of monitoring and sanctions, did not exist. In addition, sanctioning a monopolistic provider presented real management challenges in that there were not the resources or capacity to develop competition or monitor the provider in a more vigilant manner. When Kettl (1993) suggested that public managers have to be "smart buyers" in making sure the terms of the contract are executed in accordance with the goals of the public agency, he warned against insufficient oversight. However the same scenarios continue to exist and grow in their severity. A county deputy commissioner summarized the monitoring issue by stating "there is no current or consistently applied process...government has never been taught how to do this in terms of oversight." This acknowledgment, though, was not the only manner in which monitoring was addressed. Public managers expressed skepticism that nonprofit organizations were sophisticated enough to "pull the wool over our eyes" and engage in opportunistic behavior. A sense of public management pride was expressed in the manner that "I control them, I know what they're doing, and their funding and reputation are at stake." But one must question the overconfidence and excessive employment of trust and reputation as the rewards and threatened sanctions used to monitor and gain compliance as public management practices applied to social services contracting relationships.
Discussion
The findings do not neatly fit into either agency theory or stewardship theory. What is unusual and problematic from a public management perspective is that these findings are not new. The continued regularity with which independent bodies find that agency management controls, necessary for efficient and effective oversight, are not being invested in, exercised, refined, and implemented is particularly troubling.
Agency theory leads us to postulate that given conditions of low trust, a provider would be monitored with greater intensity than a trusted provider and that sanctions would be applied and enforced to any provider identified as engaged in opportunistic behavior. At the same time, stewardship theory would lead us to postulate that when information is not used for self-interest and goal alignment is achieved, the relationship may be characterized as a principal-steward relationship and providers will be monitored less and receive rewards in the form of enhanced reputation. The findings from the research interviews suggests mixed uses of these theoretical tenets and the presence of other variables, such as competition and administrative capacity, that have a profound impact on how the contract relationship is managed.
If we examine the social services contracting relationship strictly from an agency theory perspective, we find an absence of clearly defined outcomes that are observable and measurable, an insufficient level of competition, the lack of vigorous and continuously applied oversight, and the infrequent and inconsistent use of sanctions when goal divergence is identified. If the contracting relationship is to be considered strictly from a stewardship theory perspective, the findings reveal lower levels of monitoring being exercised, but is that a result of a principalsteward relationship? Variation is found in how trust and reputation are used, and how each is used as a incentive, reward, and sanction. Evidence is also found of how information is exchanged, and the opportunity afforded to nonprofit leaders and their organizations to participate, network, and influence policy. Yet, we also find examples of poor providers receiving low levels of monitoring and repeated opportunities for contracting.
However, is this a result of a principal-steward relationship, a principal-agent relationship in which goals are aligned, or the lack of provider alternatives and management capacity? The key management practices set forth in each theory are largely absent or inconsistently applied in large part because of low levels of competition and administrative capacity constraints.
Competition and capacity influenced how much latitude public managers had in their management actions. Certain cases did exist in which a provider was sanctioned using contract termination and a second provider was brought into the market, but this was the exception rather than the rule. Public managers valued and rewarded trustworthy and reputable providers with some variation. Yet, in many of the regions and service areas this issue was not as pertinent because of the lack of market competition and lack of resources necessary for developing capacity and performing oversight. The findings reveal that public managers over invest in the use of trust, reputation, reporting requirements, and their own intuition as tools and practices for managing their providers.
Is the development of contract relationships part of a deliberate public management contract strategy or an unintended consequence resulting from a lack of public management capacity and market competition? Or is it a tacit acknowledgement that the relationship is one of interdependence between the contracting parties? Agency and stewardship theory both use trust, reputation, incentives, sanctions, and oversight to achieve goal alignment. However, the findings reveal that public management contract practices are not systematically implemented as theory might suggest and that low levels of competition and capacity constraints have an important role in understanding the manner in which contract relationships are managed.
Conclusion
In examining the findings one cannot help but conclude that contractual relationships are not managed strictly from an agency or stewardship theory perspective. What is found is that there are initial value orientations that are partially consistent with the behavioral assumptions of agency theory. Namely, public agencies are initially distrusting of their contracting partners.
However, public managers also stated they do not believe nonprofit providers to be selfinterested to the exclusion of considering government's goals, nor do they perceive nonprofit providers as likely to engage in exploiting informational advantages for opportunistic gain.
Public managers were limited in their ability to tailor each individual contract to the nonprofit provider and balance the ratio of risk and sanction with the appropriate level of incentives. They were cognizant of their limited capacity to reward good nonprofits, yet they did so in creative and non-financial ways such as enhancing an organization's reputation, and advocating on nonprofit provider's behalf in future contract funding rounds. In implementation environments characterized by markets consisting of low levels of competition, nonprofits are treated as stewards, partners, and implementers of social welfare policy and often enter into long-term negotiated contracts with government agencies. These nonprofits not only serve as implementers of policy and deliverers of services, but because of public management capacity constraints, they also participate in different stages of the policy process. In many ways, these nonprofit contractors are the new de facto street-level bureaucrats.
Neither management theory appears sufficient for explaining the manner in which contract relationships with social services nonprofit organizations are managed. Both theories assume that managers have sufficient capacity for monitoring and oversight, that there are alternative providers from which to choose, and that what the agent/steward is providing is in many instances measurable and observable. Variation in the validity of these assumptions, though, emerged as the key factors explaining contract management practices. Public managers have moved far beyond operating as bureaucratic automatons executing the will of the public.
They increasingly operate in politicized administrative environments in which they manage networked relationships involving a variety of actors with diverse skills, interests, and goals.
In light of the variations in contracting arrangements, competition, and capacity levels, and the gaps in current public management theory, an ideal next step would be a quantitative analysis in which decisions affecting management style such as trust, reputation, and information could be modeled with tools such as monitoring holding constant other exogenous variables such as location (urban, rural, suburban) , market competitiveness by service/program area, number of contractors with subcontractors (the managing networked relationships scenario) and endogenous variables, such as level of public management capacity (number of public personnel with contract management responsibilities and agency budgets dedicated to administration), frequency of bid solicitations, rebidding of contracts, and development of new programs with legislative requirements that service delivery be provided by nongovernmental organizations.
Quantitatively these variables may complement the findings from this qualitative study and provide a sharper focus on the direction of the causal relationship and ordering among the variable discussed. Public managers manage contract relationships with nonprofit social service providers in environments in which low levels of competition and administrative capacity constraints largely direct the amount of time and resources they can devote to actively managing their contract providers. As the findings suggest, public managers are open to and conversant with some of the theoretical tools suggested by agency and stewardship theory, but also need to devote more time and resources to developing competitive service markets and actively managing providers. Goal Alignment: mutual goals and objectives achieved through initial trust disposition. Involvement-oriented management philosophy. Theoretical assumptions derived from organizational behavior, psychology, and sociology.
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